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Abstract A quantum protocol for bit commitment the security of which is based
on technological limitations on nondemolition measurements and long-term quan-
tum memory is presented.
Keywords Bit Commitment, Quantum Bit Commitment, Quantum Key
Distribution.
Quantum cryptography, which began with Wiesner’s idea [1] almost forty years
ago, has reached the stage of commercial key distribution devices [2,3,4]. Apart
from celebrated protocols for quantum key distribution [5,6], there has been hope
for an unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol [7]. In such a
protocol, Alice decides about the value of a bit and gives it encrypted to Bob.
Later, Alice gives Bob the key which enables him to read the bit. In an ideal bit
commitment scheme, Bob, without the key, cannot get any information about the
bit and Alice unable to change it. However, it has been shown that unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to the so called “EPR attack”,
in which Alice gives Bob one particle of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair instead
of giving him a particle in a pure quantum state [8,9]. There is now a widespread
consensus that the proof is indeed correct and we do not contest it.
In this paper we propose a quantum bit commitment protocol which, although
not unconditionally secure, is very secure in practice. Its security relies on the
current technological limitations on the storage of qubits and on nondemolition
measurements of qubits carried by photons. We believe that for any foreseen future
there will be a large gap between fidelity of immediate demolition measurements
and fidelity of measurements of photon qubits performed after a nondemolition
measurement of the presences of the photon and its long storage. This will ensure
the security of the protocol. Current classical bit commitment methods which rely
on the difficulty in performing certain computational tasks will most probably
not survive very long due to developments in computational power. But more
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importantly, it is possible for the classical methods to be broken even today by a
clever mathematician discovering an effective search algorithm.
The proposed bit commitment protocol is based on the secure quantum key
distribution protocol. In fact, various quantum key distribution methods can be
modified to fit the protocol, but we will discuss just the most famous and the sim-
plest protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard at 1984 (BB84) [5]. The main
advantages of the proposed method are its simplicity and the possibility of its
immediate realization using the technology of today. In the protocol, Alice makes
a commitment, but it is Bob who sends a number of qubits (photons) to Alice.
The protocol consists of the following steps:
1. Bob sends a number (which specifies the level of security) of photons to Alice.
The photons are prepared randomly in one of the four polarization states of
the BB84 protocol (L,R,X,Y) and sent at random times. Bob keeps the record
of when and what he has sent to Alice. (For practical reasons, Bob might send
faint pulses instead of single photons. He records then the polarization of each
pulse.)
2. Alice measures all the photons in one out of two bases and this choice manifests
her commitment. She announces immediately the times of detection of the
photons.
3. At the opening stage Alice reveals the bit commitment, i.e., the basis of each
measurement and its outcome. The outcomes have to match the polarization
states of the qubits sent by Bob in the same basis.
Since Alice reveals the outcomes of her measurements only at the opening
stage, Bob gains no information about Alice’s commitment. The times of arrival
of the photons yield no information, provided Alice arranges her detection devices
carefully, avoiding dependence of the probability of detection on the basis of photon
polarization measurement.
An effective cheating strategy for Alice, which is allowed by physical laws,
consists of a nondemolition measurement of the time of arrival of each photon
followed by storage of the qubit information encoded in the photon’s polarization
in some stable physical system. Then, just before the opening stage, Alice can
make her choice and measure the qubits in the appropriate basis. Today, however,
in spite of recent efforts [10], both nondemolition measurement and long-term
storage of qubits are out of technological reach.
The system which will allow running this bit commitment protocol is one which
provides BB84 secure secret key distribution. A source based on heralded single
photons will be very good, but even a weak pulse source will serve the purpose.
Bob should send weak enough pulses of known polarization, such that the rate of
detection of pairs of photons in a pulse, provided there are no losses in the channel,
is much smaller than the actual rate of photon detection by Alice.
A well designed device which allows secure key distribution will be at the same
time secure against a similar attempt of Alice to postpone the commitment. A
measurement in one basis destroys the eigenstates of the other basis, so Alice
cannot measure polarization in both bases. In order to cheat, Alice needs to do
something equivalent to what Eve does in the key distribution protocol: She should
try to announce only the detection of photons that arrive in pairs. If the rate of
detecting pairs p2 is too law, the best strategy of Alice is to measure polarization
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of single photons randomly in one of the intermediate Breidbart’s basis [11].
|V1〉 = sin pi
8
|X〉+ i cos pi
8
|Y 〉, |U1〉 = cos pi
8
|X〉 − i sin pi
8
|Y 〉, (1)
|V2〉 = sin pi
8
|X〉 − i cos pi
8
|Y 〉, |U2〉 = cos pi
8
|X〉+ i sin pi
8
|Y 〉. (2)
This will lead to the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of Alice’s measurement
relative to Bob’s chosen basis of:
QBER = sin2
pi
8
· 100% ∼= 15%, (3)
and to the expected 50% for the orthogonal basis (due to random choice of Alice’s
bases). Thus, the total QBER when Alice cheats using ideal devices is:
QBER ∼= (1− p2) · 15%. (4)
A practically secure bit commitment should have lower error rate.
The current proposal has much in common with the (non-secure) bit commit-
ment method described by Bennett and Brassard [5]. In their method the setup is
essentially the same, but the protocol is different. Bob, instead of sending random
polarizations (L,R,X,Y), records and sends random polarization either among the
pair (L,R) or the pair (X,Y). His choice manifests the commitment he makes to
Alice. Now, Alice measures the photons in random bases and records the results.
At the opening stage, Bob reveals the commitment and provides the polarizations
of the photons he sent, which should coincide with polarizations measured by Alice
in the same basis. The cheating strategy for Bob consists of sending one photon
from an EPR pair and keeping the second photon until he really wants to make
the commitment. Since today long-term qubit memory is unavailable, this method
is also practically secure. However, its security is significantly weaker than the pro-
posed method. The difference is that in this method Bob can perform an unlimited
number of trials for creating an EPR pair in which one particle is a photon and
the other is a stable qubit. (“Stable qubit” might be, e.g., a quantum state of a
two-level atom.) Therefore, in order to cheat, it is sufficient to have a technology
that is at all capable of creating such pairs, however inefficient. In contrast, in the
proposed scheme we have to be able to measure the time of arrival of each photon
as well as transfer its qubit to a stable system with finite efficiency. The required
efficiency depends on the losses of the actual quantum channel and Alice’s ability
to reduce these losses. Also, the allowed error rate in Alice’s procedure is specified
by the error rate in the transmitted qubits, which is low in current experiments.
We have learned recently that Damgard et al. proposed to switch the roles of
Alice and Bob already at 2005 [12]. However, what is missing in their proposal
is a random timing (or faint pulses) which eliminates requirement of technology
of nondemolition measurements. The security of their method relies solely on the
absence of reliable storage of photon qubits.
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In the proposed method, a qubit may be encoded in various ways in the quan-
tum state of a photon, not necessarily in its polarization. A promising possibility
for bit commitment, when there is a large distance between Alice and Bob, is using
time bin encoding [13,14]. The difficulty with long distance protocols is that most
of them, for solving the problem of disturbances, use two-line two-way quantum
channels. This allows to cancel uncontrollable disturbances introduced by the two
lines. The two-way protocol cannot be easily adapted for the proposed bit com-
mitment, so the time bin encoding which can be implemented in a single quantum
line is advantageous.
It is important to note that, even for short distances, quantum bit commitment
is of great importance since it achieves a task which cannot be achieved using
classical means. For the purpose of secret key distribution, Alice and Bob, when
they are not far from each other, can just meet and bring one another the “one
time pad”. But secret bit commitment is something Alice and Bob cannot perform
even if they are sitting together. Unconditionally secure classical bit commitment
requires a trusted party. Thus, we return to the situation in which the difference
between classical and quantum cryptographic methods boils down to the former
being based on the security offered by computational complexity, and the latter
on the technological feasibility of quantum nondemolition measurements and long-
term quantum memory.
Note that the error rate in quantum communication for short distances is very
low using current technology, therefore the proposed bit commitment method is
highly secure. The gap between the error rate of an immediate demolition mea-
surement and that of a postponed measurement (i.e., following a nondemolition
measurement of the photon’s time of arrival and qubit storage) will remain signifi-
cant for a long time, providing high security for bit commitment between proximate
parties.
To test the proposed protocol we have built a toy quantum communication
system, using fiber optic components. The qubit encoding was based on the pro-
posal of Townsend et al. [15] for quantum cryptography systems. The latter is
based on splitting a photon into two time bins, using unbalanced Mach Zehnder
interferometer (UMZI), and modulating the relative phase between them for the
qubit encoding. The four qubit states are then:
|X〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉+ |B〉),
|Y 〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉 − |B〉), (5)
|L〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉+ i|B〉),
|R〉 = 1√
2
(|A〉 − i|B〉),
where |A〉 and |B〉 are the outputs of the short arm and the long arm of the UMZI,
respectively. These time bins are then transmitted to Alice’s identical UMZI, and
the outcome of her measurement is the result of interference of the long-short +
short-long time bins. Alice can control her measurement basis by modulating the
relative phase in her UMZI.
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Fig. 1 A schematic diagram of the QBC system. DAQ-data acquisition card; NDF-natural
density filter; PM-piezoelectric mount; SPD-single photon detectors; PC-polarization con-
troller.
We use a nanosecond pulse laser (Toptica iPulse) as a photon source, and
a single mode optical fiber as a quantum channel (Fig. 1). The laser pulse is
attenuated to the single photon regime (0.2 photons per pulse on average) using
neutral density filters. Subsequently, the faint pulse is coupled into the fiber-optic
UMZI. The UMZI itself is constructed of 2X2 fiber couplers, each with a 50/50
splitting ratio. The long arm of the UMZI consists of a 15m-long single mode
fiber, and the short arm is a free-space delay line, adjustable by means of a high-
resolution piezoelectric actuator. The later is controlled by Bob’s computer, and
allows encoding of 4 different phase shifts, associated with the four different qubits.
The encoded double faint pulses are transmitted through a single mode fiber to
Alice’s receiver.
The encoded double pulses enter Alice’s identical fiber-optic UMZI. The free
space delay line is again controlled by a piezoelectric actuator, which allows the
setting of the measurement basis by Alice’s computer. A polarization controller
in Alice’s UMZI allows compensation for polarization rotations in the fibers, and
ensures that the interfering pulses (long-short + short-long) reach the final fiber
coupler with the same polarization. The exit ports of Bob’s UMZI are coupled
to two single-photon detectors (SPD-idquantique id100), whose outputs represent
the two possible outcomes of the measurement (1 and 0). The SPD signals are
sampled by a data acquisition card, which is trigged by a synchronization signal
sent by Bob. This allows selective detection of the photons which arrive during
the time window corresponding to the interference pulse.
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Fig. 2 Opening stage results of five QBC protocol runs with 200 sent qubits each. The black
(gray) columns represents measurement success rate when the sent qubit was (was not) in the
commitment basis.
Figure 2 shows typical results obtained with the toy system described above.
The data clearly shows a consistently higher success rate for measurements with
identical bases compared to measurements with different bases. However, the ex-
perimental QBER is higher (i.e. fidelity is lower) than that required for compliance
with the theoretical security limit (15 percent QBER). The reason for this is a low
interference visibility, due to limitations of the laser switching. Nevertheless, these
results show that the protocol is feasible with current technology quantum commu-
nications. We believe that a more robust implementation would be able to compete
with classical methods based on computational complexity.
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